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"Legal Hazards to Efficient Water Allocation"
Chuck Howe Plenary Talk
Extended Abstract
Laws change slowly in response to changing social and economic values. In the
eastern U.S., the need to change from the English Common Law riparian doctrine becomes
more obvious as the supply/demand relationship tightens and as climate forecasts become
more daunting.
In the western states, appropriations doctrine has served us well for over 100
years, defining water ownership while allowing water to move to emerging, higher-valued
uses. Nonetheless, western water laws are changing, partly under pressure of federal laws but
also because of increased demand pressures and recognition of environmental values.
However, even with contemporary adaptations, priority doctrine can conflict with the most
economic use of water resources, i.e. in conflict with "economic efficiency".
A possible case in point is the surface water-groundwater conflict in the South
Platte Basin of Colorado where irrigation pumping has been sharply curtailed to protect
senior surface rights. This curtailment is in keeping with water law since the wells are quite
junior but these measures have caused great distress in the affected farm communities,
reaching well beyond the farms themselves. Whatever the comparison of seniors' gains to
farm losses, the curtailment is denying use of the aquifer as efficient storage and drought
insurance to the basin's water system. Further, all upstream parties junior to the senior
surface user have had to stop diverting during the call, regardless of their losses. Among
these parties in the South Platte case are several towns that place high value on the water they
would otherwise be using or storing. Water left in the stream at these upstream locations may
not contribute much to downstream flows ("futile calls") because of transit losses. Thus there
is a high likelihood that priority calls will result in economic losses to the river as a whole.
In the past, "gentlemen's agreements" delayed calls by the downstream reservoirs
when there was still a good chance that the reservoirs might fill later in the spring. The
acquisition of augmentation water for the wells that might prevent the call-out has been
complicated by the increased frequency of calls due to drought and the tightening supplydemand situation. Market prices for senior water rights or leases have increased beyond the
ability of some irrigators to pay for augmentation water.
In situations like this, there certainly are water market forces that, in the long
term, might help moderate such conflicts. If the wells are more profitable than the surface
uses that placed the call, efficient water markets would motivate payment to the seniors for
subordination of their priorities. However, water markets, in general, are characterized by
high transaction costs and selective transactions like this are complicated by the existence of
many affected parties affected by the call.
Again, the conflict with groundwater affects the ability of the integrated system to
make appropriate use of the aquifer as the most efficient reservoir storage and distributary.
The aquifer provides drought insurance when appropriately integrated into basin operations.
Unfortunately, it is just during droughts that wells are likely to be called out.
Other types of water law-economic efficiency conflicts can be cited, including
treatment of the "no injury" requirement, the special treatment of "imported waters",
interpretations of "beneficial use" that preclude holding water for longer term purposes ( the
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bugaboo of "speculation"), the creation of conditional water rights and prohibitions of out-ofbasin transfers.
A situation similar to the South Platte exists on the Snake River, Idaho but a
major planning effort and the use of a wider range of water market arrangements (water
banks, rental pools, mitigation plans, subordination arrangements, recharge projects, seepage
loss credits, & water rights retirements) seems to be alleviating the situation. Gary Johnson
and Donna Cosgrove ("Aquifer Management Zones...", JWRP&M ASCE, Mar/Apr 2005)
have argued that overly strict interpretation of the "no injury" rule for groundwater permit
transfers in Idaho have discouraged beneficial market activity. Haddad has argued that
environmental constraints on water rights transfers in California have unduly restricted water
market activity (Haddad, 2000, Rivers of Gold: Designing Markets to Allocate Water in
California, Island press, 2000).
A longer time perspective may suggest that strict enforcement of the law
promotes longer term economic efficiency even though it may induce short term losses (as
above). Well defined and enforced property rights are the foundation for long term contracts
and investments. If we were starting anew in the design of western water law, it might be
possible to avoid this type of conflict between short term and long term efficiency. A system
of tradable, divisible, proportional permits might prove desirable, but such a change is no
more possible in the western United States than the acceptance of priority doctrine is in the
eastern states. There is too much history to allow radical change.
Are there other opportunities to improve the economic efficiency of water
administration within the priority doctrine? The enhancement of the role of water markets
would be a step in the right direction if it could be accomplished through the reduction of
transaction costs and not at the cost of needed public oversight of water transfers. Markets
always need some degree of social oversight to allow for non-market values and equity
concerns. Frequently there is too much oversight, leading to some of the inefficiencies cited
earlier.
The critical nature of transaction costs has been cited in a huge literature. Any
steps to reduce transaction costs without foregoing needed oversight will stimulate beneficial
water market activity. In the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District, 25% of all
permanent share transfers are from one agricultural use to another in contrast to the ag-tourban pattern in other Colorado water markets. This is attributable in part to very low
transaction costs. An excessively long review period for water bank transactions was a major
cause of the failure of the Arkansas River Basin Water Bank. Colorado has been shown to
have longer review times and more numerous transfer protests than other western states
(MacDonnell et al, 1990). Avoiding protests of transfers has been shown to greatly reduce
transaction costs (Howe, Boggs and Butler, 1990).
Where does this leave us? The reduction of groundwater irrigated land means the
loss of the natural functions of the aquifer including the insurance value of groundwater. Is it
possible that cities could buy the land and make use of the abandoned wells? They would be
faced with the same augmentation requirements but, since those requirements are usually less
than the full pumping volume, there still may be advantages to the cities, especially as
drought insurance. If well owner associations can develop reservoir sites for storage of junior
rights, the water could be used for augmentation. The system in use in the Purgatoire Water
Conservancy District in southeastern Colorado allows priorities to be foregone when there is

2

sufficient water in the "conservation pool". The users then share the inflow on a pro-rata
basis based on acres irrigated or flow rates of the rights. If a user desires a greater flow, they
can draw on their share of the stored water. If the water in storage falls to a critical level,
diversions revert to priorities. This opens possibilities for well owners who are members of a
conservation district.
Speculation was an issue when the western rivers were first tapped for human use:
individuals could not be allowed to claim the entire flow for instream or navigation uses.
Claims had to be supported by demonstration of a "beneficial use" before water rights were
registered. What constitutes "beneficial use" has been difficult to define with clarity. There
have been very few cases in which water rights have been forfeited because the water was
not being beneficially used in the eyes of water courts. On the other hand, the acquisition of
rights for purposes of transferring to new uses has been denied by Colorado courts if a
definite buyer has not been contracted. A case in point is that of the High Plains Consortium
that purchased farms, options and water rights on the Fort Lyon Canal in Southeastern
Colorado with the intent of ultimately transferring water to urban buyers. Purchasers had not
been identified but the prospects for a demand for the water on profitable terms seemed a
reasonable business decision. Application for changes of use of the water rights was denied
by the Division Engineer and sustained by the Colorado Supreme Court for lack of specific
buyer.
Speculation in situations like that can be a reflection of superior foresight. After
all, the biggest speculators are farmers themselves who hold on to water rights to benefit
from rising prices. Cities, too, are allowed to speculate through the holding of conditional
water rights.
Thus there appear to be ways through which the economic efficiency of our water
use patterns can be substantially improved within the framework of appropriations doctrine
and not in its abandonment.
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